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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Less than a year into the Civil War, one of the most significant battles of the
western campaign took place at Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank of the Tennessee
River. The battle was named after the nearby church (Figure 1), “Shiloh”, which came
from the First Book of Samuel in the Old Testament and ironically referred to a religious
center roughly translated as “peace”, to which the Hebrews annually made a pilgrimage
(Daniel, 1997).

Figure 1

A reconstruction of the Shiloh meeting house (Taken by Dr. Christopher
Dewey).
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The climatology and geography of Shiloh have never been fully investigated by
historians, yet they were major factors in shaping the battle and affecting the outcome.
The Battle of Shiloh is also known as the Battle of Pittsburg Landing. The Union named
the engagement after the landing stage they used along the Tennessee River, whereas the
Confederates referred to the Battle by the name of the church reached by the
Confederates the during first day of battle.
According to Cunningham (2007), General Johnston wanted the battle to start
early April 3rd, 1862, but communication complications and sodden terrain forced
Southern commanders to postpone the battle until the morning of April 5th. Due to
further communication failure and reports of inclement weather, the battle actually began
April 6th, 1862, when two scouting parties inadvertently ran into each other around five
o’clock that morning (Daniel, 1997). Even after the initial skirmishes had begun, frontline Union Brigadier General Sherman did not accept the possibility that the Confederacy
had any military strength within the area. Sherman’s opinion was based upon
intelligence from months before and because the fact that the Union army had moved so
easily into Tennessee without meeting any formidable Confederate forces. Sherman is
even reported as having told one concerned soldier, “There is no enemy closer than
Corinth” (Paludon, 2006). When the battle began, therefore, the Confederate forces had
the element of surprise, but poor communication between the Southern commanders,
combined with a poor use of the terrain compromised the development of a unified plan
of action and the ability to capitalize on the disorganization in the Union camp.
In hindsight, it is clear that Tennessee was of significant strategic value, having
wooded mountains, clear streams and rocky bluffs, rolling fields with rich soil and
abundant wildlife to be hunted (Cottrell, 2001). Tennessee contained junctions for every
2

major railway in the South, was one of the major food producers and the contained the
largest gunpowder mill for the Confederacy. Moreover, the greatest iron and copper
production was located in the Cumberland Gap (Figures 2 & 3).

Figure 2

The Cumberland Gap (from: www.uky.edu).
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Figure 3

Union Troops depicted marching through the Cumberland Gap (from:
www.sonofthesouth.net/leefoundation/civil-war/1863/october/cumberlandgap.jpg).

City positions in Tennessee were therefore a strategic target for the Union. Not
only was Nashville the leading center for war materials production, it also blocked the
invasion path to Chattanooga and Atlanta, both of which were key industrial cities for the
South. All these elements also made Tennessee crucial for the survival of the
Confederacy. In early 1862, however, the Confederate capital was moved from
Montgomery, AL to Richmond, VA; therefore, Tennessee was not considered to be a
major concern of defense by Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Had the capital
remained in Montgomery, Alabama, where it would have been more easily defended, the
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strategic value of Tennessee might not have been so easily overlooked and more
resources might have been accorded to the Western Campaign.
Aside from the political implications of decisions that affected the Battle of
Shiloh, there are also the climatic and terrain conditions to be considered. Torrential rain,
lightning and thunder were reported in letters and field diaries of soldiers and
commanders in the months and days leading up to the battle, and even after the first day
of the battle (Paludon, 2006). The effects of excessive rainfall from January to April on
nearby swamps, creeks, streams, and the Tennessee River were also significant to the
tactical use of troops prior to, and during, the battle. Due to the rising water levels on the
Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, the South lost two important control points, Fort
Henry and Fort Donelson (Figure 4), earlier in February (Paludon, 2006).

Figure 4

Forts Henry and Donelson (McDonough, 1977).
5

Fort Henry was situated in the middle of the Tennessee River on a small island,
but due to the amount of rain the fort was flooded, making defense untenable. After the
surrender of Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, which was located on the Cumberland River,
was not hard to capture. General Grant, commanding the Army of the Ohio laid siege to
the flooding fort and bombarded the Confederates with cannon fire from Ironclads
moving with the army upstream to Pittsburg Landing. After the fall of Forts Henry and
Donelson, field commanders on both sides could see that the outcome of the next major
engagement, which would eventually be fought at Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee
River would become the key to winning, the war in the Western Theater. Moreover, by
the time the battle was set, neither side was oblivious to the fact the outcome would have
larger ramifications for the security of the Confederacy and therefore, the entire war.
The objective of the thesis is to describe the effects that terrain and climate had
upon the Battle of Shiloh. Tactical and strategic decisions were, studied to reveal the
meteorological events and physiographic elements that influenced battle plans and
decisions.

6

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL REVIEW
Leading to Shiloh
In late July 1861, Confederate Brigadier General Felix K. Zollicoffer was
stationed in Knoxville, TN (Figure 5) with orders to protect the railroad hub there and
block any Northern attempts to smuggle arms to Union supporters in the region.

Figure 5

Knoxville, TN (McDonough, 1977).

In 1861, an outspoken unionist preacher, William B. Carter, proposed that key
bridges and railroads connecting East Tennessee to Middle Tennessee, Georgia, and
Virginia be burned and destroyed. Carter presented the plan in Washington to President
Lincoln, the Secretary of War Simon Cameron, and Major General George B. McClellan.
7

All three men approved of the idea and Carter returned to Tennessee gathering men to
perform the operation. Carter carried out his plan without Federal aid on the night of
November 8th, 1861. Carter’s men succeeded in destroying five of nine bridges: the
Hiwassee River Bridge in Bradley County, the Lick Creek Bridge near Greenville, the
Holston River Bridge in Sullivan County, and two spans over Chickamauga Creek near
Chattanooga. The four that were not destroyed were saved by Confederate action.
Carter’s operation upset transportation lines for three different railroads; the trains came
to a halt on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at two junctions and the Western and
Atlantic Railroad, which ran from Atlanta to Chattanooga.

Figure 6

Map of Southern Railway (McDonough, 1977).
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Along with the five bridges, Carter’s men destroyed telegraph lines severing
communications at crucial points. Brigadier General Sherman was expected to be
Carter’s invasion aid, but Sherman feared if he left his post, in Louisville, KY (Figure 7),
that Confederate General Zollicoffer would invade Kentucky (Cottrell, 2001).

Figure 7

Louisville, KY (McDonough, 1977).

General Zollicoffer died on January 19th, 1862, in a skirmish during which
rainfall prevented gun powder from igniting. Zollicoffer’s army then scattered and
Tennessee became vulnerable to Union invasion. The path was now cleared for Union
Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant, commanding the land forces, and Flag Officer
Andrew H. Foote, commanding the naval squadron, to move on Fort Henry, which lay on
the east bank of the Tennessee River, and Fort Donelson, on the west bank of the
Cumberland, twelve miles away (Cottrell, 2001).
9

The Confederate strategic defenses of Tennessee were weakened severely with
the losses of the flooded Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, leaving Grant with an open and
navigable river path almost to Corinth (Figure 8).

Figure 8

Opening to Corinth (McDonough, 1977).

Grant stated, “Troops which were to invest Fort Henry (Figure 9) were delayed
for want of roads, as well as by dense forest and the high water in what would in dry
weather have been unimportant beds of streams” (Paludon, 2006).
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Figure 9

Fort Henry (Davis, 2003).

Grant wanted to leave some men occupying Fort Henry, but the fort was too
battered and flooded to be useful so he moved on to take Fort Donelson (Figure 10).
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Figure 10

Fort Donelson (Davis, 2003).

After these two key losses in early February, which, given the current conditions
of the rivers were undependable locations for a proper defense, General Johnston
withdrew his forces to Corinth, MS to reorganize. During this maneuver, Johnston wrote
to his good friend, Confederate President Jefferson Davis, stating his concerns about
needing more men and weapons to defend Tennessee. Davis denied Johnston his
requests, because he believed the real war was in the east and was insulted that Johnston
would ask for support to be drawn from the east. The exchange between Johnston and
12

Davis underscores the lack of military insight by the Confederate leadership at a critical
juncture in the development of the Western Campaign. Three weeks later, after realizing
the west was indeed more important than previously realized, Davis sent some men to
Johnston’s aide but not enough for the general to be confident in his numbers (Wallace,
2000). After General Beauregard was defeated the Battle of Shiloh, the Confederate
government will realize their strategic error. In early March, Union General Halleck
responded to Johnston’s movements into Mississippi by ordering General Grant to
advance the Union Army of West Tennessee up the Tennessee River (Wallace, 2000).
The Northern armies employed the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers as avenues of
invasion into the heartland of the South, striking at the population centers of Tennessee,
at railroad lines connecting the Confederacy, and at the industrial centers of Chattanooga,
Nashville, and Atlanta. Two political and additional strategic prizes of this heartland
region were the border states of Kentucky and Missouri (Figure 11), which were critical
to both sides for recruitment and obtaining munitions (Cunningham, 2007).

Figure 11

Map of the Union (Blue), the Confederacy (Red), and the Border States
(Light Blue) (http://awesomestories.com/assets/map-depicting-borderstates-us-civil-war).
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The Tennessee and the Cumberland rivers dissected the heartland region of the
Confederacy, and would be of great use for moving troops and supplies with minimum
cost. The Tennessee was navigable from its mouth east of Knoxville, through Western
Kentucky and Tennessee, and into the northern part of Alabama as far as Muscle Shoals,
while the Cumberland could be navigated well beyond Nashville. In the eastern region
were the Cumberland Mountains which could be crossed at certain passes, the most
important of which was the Cumberland Gap (Figures 2 & 3). The Tennessee and
Georgia Railway followed the Valley and Ridge topography into Virginia, making it one
of the main lines of communications between the Southern armies operating in that
region and the Gulf States (Cunningham, 2007). The railway was therefore of strategic
value to the Union for separating the Confederacy into two discrete regions. If the Union
forces could develop a strong presence and secure a logistical base from which to
advance, they could easily drive out the comparatively small Confederate force in the
area of southern Tennessee and northern Mississippi. If the North took control of this
region, the South would lose vital railways, thereby severing communication and supply
lines. Corinth, MS was a vital railway hub for the South, connecting the west to the east
by way of the Memphis-Charleston and the Mobile-Ohio railways (Figure 6). As a
strategic goal, if the North could capture Corinth, the Confederacy would be split in half.
General Grant began to move his Army of the Tennessee south by way of the
Tennessee River, while General Buell marched his Army of the Ohio south from
Louisville, Kentucky to meet with Grant in Savannah, TN (Daniel, 1997). As part of
their line of defense, the Confederates erected forts at a series of strategic points
stretching across Tennessee, Missouri, and Kentucky (Cunningham, 2007). The
Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers were important waterways that ran across Kentucky
14

and down into Tennessee. At the start of the war, the Confederacy respected Kentucky’s
choice of neutrality and built their forts within the state of Tennessee. Fort Henry and
Fort Heiman were erected twelve miles apart on the Tennessee River and Fort Donelson
was built on the Cumberland River. At this time General Albert Sidney Johnston, the
most senior general of the Confederacy before General Lee, was based in Bowling Green,
Kentucky. Since the confederacy did not want to build forts in Kentucky, the decision
for the location of Fort Henry was both hastily and poorly made, but the Confederacy
could not afford to wait for Kentucky to be occupied. The fort was equipped with
seventeen guns, eleven for the riverfront and six for the landward side. Although the fort
could help defend the river, it was situated on low terrain surrounded by high ground on
both sides of the river (Cottrell, 2001). The most significant problem with the fort
location was not its strategic or tactical value, but its susceptibility to flooding by the
Tennessee River. Captain Jesse Taylor expressed concerns about flooding, noting that
when the Tennessee was high, the fort could be flooded at its highest point within the fort
by two feet. General Johnston was notified and sent an engineer to remedy the problem,
if possible. Fort Donelson, however, on the Cumberland River, was in a much better
geographic position. The fort was located on top of bluffs overlooking the river. From
this position the guns could enfilade enemy ships below. On February 5th, Brigadier
General Lloyd Tilghman was in command of Fort Henry, and batteries within the fort
exchanged shots with the ironclad U.S.S. Essex until nightfall. The following day
Tilghman evacuated all personnel to Fort Donelson except for himself and the gunners of
the heavy artillery. After the evacuation, Tilghman and eighty of his men were left to
defend the fort from any Union attacks (Daniel, 1997). While the Essex kept Tilghman
and his men busy, General Grant and his men struggled to get around Tilghman’s
15

position. Grant’s advance was slower than expected due to the flooded terrain and the
heavy rainfall the night before (Cunningham, 2007). Tilghman and his crew of eighty
dueled with the seven Union gunships for about forty-five minutes. Tilghman
surrendered about two o’clock with only two working guns and not enough men to man
both, after the U.S.S Lexington had pounded the fort to rubble. General Grant and his
men did not arrive until about three o’clock at which time he took command (Cottrell,
2001).
The evacuated Confederates barely made it to Fort Donelson before dark on the
same day. Grant wrote to General Halleck concerning the capture of Fort Henry and also
wrote that on February 8th he would take Fort Donelson. Given the combat conditions,
his estimate was actually unrealistic. The gunboats: U.S.S. Essex, U.S.S. St. Louis,
U.S.S. Cincinnati, U.S.S. Carondolet (Ironclads), U.S.S. Tyler, U.S.S. Lexington, and
U.S.S. Conestoga (Timberclads) needed to head back downstream to Paducha and make
their way on to the Cumberland. The U.S.S. Essex also needed major repairs after
shelling Fort Henry. Combined with the lack of gunship support Grant was also
hampered by bad weather and sodden terrain, making an assault on the 8th, highly
unlikely (Cunningham, 2007). Even so, with the fall of Fort Henry General Johnston’s
system of defense was seriously compromised.
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Figure 12

Movements during and after the Fort Henry Campaign (Daniel, 1997).

General Johnston was therefore forced to move his men south around Memphis
and Nashville to try and keep Tennessee under Confederate control and block any Union
advance along either the Tennessee or the Cumberland rivers (Figure 12). On the night
of February 12th Grant and his army finally reached Fort Donelson and began to surround
it, while on the waterfront the U.S.S. Carondolet appeared within site of the fort. General
Grant was content to let the gunboats pound the fort since his army had not completely
surrounded the fort. Believing he had found a weakness, General McClernand ordered
four of his regiments to attack the fort. They were rebuffed after taking heavy casualties.
17

After McClernand’s failure to take the fort, Grant ordered the U.S.S. Carondolet to pound
the fort, which it did until a serious hit on the gunship forced it to withdraw for repairs.
Later the gunship returned and traded shots with the fort until nightfall. When the other
gunboats arrived the next day the shelling was renewed and the duel continued until night
fall when the gunboats fell back. General Grant was later asked to conference with
Captain Walke aboard the U.S.S. St. Louis, where Walke told Grant he would have to
leave for repairs but could be back in ten days. As Grant arrived back at shore he was
surprised to find that the Confederates had mounted a heavy attack. General Floyd, in
command of Fort Donelson, had decided to evacuate the fort and head to Charlotte, TN.
Floyd planned to hit Grant’s right flank in an effort to secure the road and make good his
escape. By noon the next day the Confederates had taken control of the Charlotte Road
and created a hole in the Union Army, but instead of taking advantage of the momentum
to force their escape, the Confederates wasted valuable time and became trapped in the
fort (Cunningham, 2007). On February 14th it was decided the fort would be surrendered
and that General Buckner would stay behind. Generals Floyd and Pillow both escaped
with their men along the river, while Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest
(Calvary Commander) fought his way down the last open road out of the fort. The loss of
Donelson was a serious strategic loss for the Confederacy. Now that both Fort Henry and
Fort Donelson had been taken by the Union, the heart of Tennessee was compromised
and the way to Corinth, MS was now clear.
After the fall of both forts southern politicians looks for a person to blame.
President Davis received many request to relieve Johnston of his command. After so
many requests President Davis dismissed them all saying, “If Sidney Johnston is not a
general, we had better give up the war for we have no general” (Cunningham, 2007). It is
18

true that General Johnston had spread his forces too thin to protect southern Kentucky
and Tennessee, but after losing Forts Henry and Donelson he began to reorganize and
reassemble his army in order to protect the Mississippi Valley. Confederate Secretary of
War Judah P. Benjamin maintained that the administration was contemplating an
abandonment of the sea coast in order to defend the Tennessee line (Cunningham, 2007).
By this time U.S. General Don Carlos Buell and his Army of the Ohio was leaving
Bowling Green, KY and heading to Nashville for occupation while U.S. General F. Smith
was moving towards Pittsburg landing with Grant’s Army of the Tennessee. The Union
General Halleck had an uneasy relationship with Grant and did not trust him. He
considered Grant a threat to his quest for overall command of the western theater and
suspended Grant until further notice, placing General Smith in control of Grant’s army.
Had General Halleck not suspended Grant at this time, it is possible that Grant and Buell
could have joined forces to destroy General Johnston’s army before it ran south.
President Lincoln realized Grant was a necessity for the Union army and promoted him to
Major General and made General Halleck Commander of the Western forces (Cottrell,
2001).
By March 26th General Johnston was in need of both men, and intelligence
concerning the disposition of enemy forces. Johnston had the duty to protect Corinth,
which was the hub between the Confederate Western Theater and the capital at
Richmond, VA. He was in overall command of the largest war department in the
Confederacy and yet he had the fewest resources with which to work. He knew that the
bulk of the Union army was moving towards Pittsburg Landing and Crump’s Landing but
did not know the extent of their lines (Daniel, 1997). Professional topographic maps
were scarce so Johnston reached out for citizen help as scouts to help map out the terrain
19

north of Corinth. According to Sun Tzu, “Those who do not know the conditions of
mountains and forest, hazardous defiles, marshes and swamps, cannot conduct the march
of an army” (Giles, 2011). The lack of knowledge concerning the details of the terrain,
combined with the effects of weather conditions that altered terrain would prove to be a
serious problem for the South.
While these civilians scouted the area north of Corinth, Johnston placed the
responsibility of concentrating and building a mobile army for repulsing the Union
invasion on the shoulders of General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard. In the next few
days forty thousand men made their way to Corinth by railcar (Figure 12). Only two
roads led to Pittsburg Landing: Ridge Road, which ran north, and then turned northeast,
and the Monterey Road, which snaked northeast but turned north at the village of
Monterey, where it became Savannah Road (Daniel, 1997). The two roads intersected at
the James Mickey farmhouse, about four miles from Federal lines. Beauregard’s
marching orders directed General Hardee’s corps to advance along the Ridge Road,
followed by Clark’s division of General Polk’s corps. Cheatham’s division, at Bethel
Station, would unite with Polk on the march at the intersection of Ridge and Purdy
Roads. General Bragg’s corps was to file out along the Monterey Road. Once past the
Monterey, Wither’s division would proceed to Mickey’s by way of the Savannah Road,
to arrive by sunset. General Ruggles’s division was to take Purdy Road from Monterey
until it intersected with the Ridge Road. Polk was to halt his troops at the intersection
and allow Ruggles’s division to pass. The Reserve Corps, marching from Burnsville,
would travel the most convenient route to Monterey, and then to Mickey’s (Daniel,
1997). It is unfortunate that the marching orders placed the bulk of the army on the
longest route to Pittsburg Landing. Once the pieces had been placed, the basic battle plan
20

was to turn the left flank of Grant’s army away from the river and drive them into the
Owl Creek Swamp to the northwest to force surrender. When the two armies finally met,
however, the Confederates evenly distributed their troops along a three-mile front instead
of placing the bulk of the strength on the Confederate right. Beauregard thought the
Union could never stand against three waves of Confederates, and ignored the dictates of
the terrain for obtaining an advantage. Moreover, Beauregard failed to employ the use of
force at what Clausewitz (1984) called the “Schwerpunkt” (or center of gravity). Both
the terrain and the concept of using overwhelming force at a point of weakness indicated
that the Confederate right should be the hammer of the Confederate attack; however,
Beauregard failed on both accounts.
The night of April 3rd Clark’s weary troops bivouacked on the road. About two in
the morning a torrential downpour with hail occurred and a light rain continued into the
next morning (Daniel, 1997). On the Monterey Road, Ruggles’s men were having
trouble moving artillery. A journalist traveling with the corps described the road as “very
rough and hilly, with occasional swamps.” The only alternate route available to Bragg’s
corps (present Highway 22) had already been flooded by Lick Creek. Breckinridge had
to send an aide to General Johnston to report artillery mired in the mud. When Johnston
asked about cutting a new road the aide told him they had no axes, with which to work,
due to the hasty assembly of the corps. It was long after midnight when the mud-clogged
wagons and field artillery rolled into the staging area for the battle (Daniel, 1997).
Late on April 4th Hardee’s men escorted several Union prisoners into the
Confederate camp for interrogation. Among the prisoners was Major LeRoy Crockett.
When asked about entrenchments, the Major let it be known there were none at Pittsburg
Landing, and that the Union army knew nothing of the Confederate presence in the area.
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In the evening the torrential rain was reported in the diaries of many of the men on both
sides. General Johnston stepped out during a slack period and summoned Lieutenant
George W. Baylor: “Lieutenant, I wish you to go to General Beauregard and ask him if
we had better not postpone the attack until Sunday, on account of the rain” (Daniel,
1997). The lieutenant worked his way over to Beauregard’s tent to find the general
awake and at work. Although no justification was recorded, Beauregard responded to
Johnston’s question, “We’d better attack at daylight.” The exchange demonstrated that
although showed that Johnston was the leader of the army on paper, Beauregard viewed
the relationship as more of a partnership. At three the next morning, the troops were
formed into ranks but forward movement was again delayed by drenching rain. A Union
soldier, James Rosser noted, “One of the hardest rains fell I ever saw in life and wound
up in considerable hail.” A Tennessee soldier stated,” We were drawn up on the edge of
the road. As we stood there, troops tramped by in the mud and rain and darkness. To us
who were simply standing in line in the rain it was bad enough, but those men who were
going by were wading, stumbling and plunging through water a foot deep” (Daniel,
1997).
The plan had called for Hardee’s corps to reach Mickey’s by the night of the 3rd
but many of these troops had never made a day’s march and were therefore ill-prepared
both for the duration of the march and the conditions of the terrain. Had these troops
been experienced and had reasonable terrain to cover, it would have been possible for the
battle to begin on time but these were unseasoned troops facing marching on poor roads
in bad weather conditions. Meanwhile, on the narrow muddy road Monterey Road,
Bragg’s troops were falling even further behind schedule. His division marched all night
to reach Mickey’s the morning of the 4th (McDonough, 1977). Bragg was afraid if he
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sent his men to pass in front of Polk’s men at the intersection of Purdy and Ridge Road in
accordance with his marching orders, he would delay Polk.

Figure 13

Confederate March (McDonough, 1977).

Polk had a smaller command and shorter distance to travel, so it seemed he would
reach Mickey’s first, but Polk waited at the intersection for three hours before Bragg’s
courier reached him of Bragg’s decision to take the Savannah Road. Rain poured
continuously through the night and early the next morning, sometimes in torrents, until
much of the ground was mud and water. When daylight came, Hardee tried to form his
corps for an attack but many of the soldiers were test-firing their weapons to see if the
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powder was still dry. Polk and Bragg had both lost direct command of all their divisional
components due to the combination of complicated marching orders and bad weather,
which made it difficult when they tried to form their lines. To compound matters, rations
were low and the quarter-master wagons were miles behind, unable to keep up with the
troops because of the road conditions.
Finally a council was called, but rations and troop dispositions were not the only
topic of the council. In contrast to his message to Johnston the night before, Beauregard
argued against an offensive effort after such a prolonged march. His plan had been
predicated upon a quick overland march and a surprise attack on non-entrenched troops.
Moreover, Beauregard feared that the Union army had to know of the Confederate
presence after such a long march full of delays. Also, in contrast to his question to
Beauregard from the night before, Johnston stood firm and declared that the attack was to
continue as planned (McDonough, 1977).
It is interesting to note how both sides lacked reliable intelligence concerning the
location and size of the opposing army. Beauregard should have been correct in his
assessment that the Union should be aware of the Confederate presence so close by their
own lines. General Grant stayed at the hotel in Savannah while his army bivouacked
wherever the ground permitted, from the Pittsburg Landing all the way to the Shiloh
meeting house. The choice of the camp sites were based upon convenience rather than
defense. Both Grant and Sherman were confident that the South would take a defensive
position at Corinth (Daniel, 1997). It is curious that neither Grant nor Sherman ordered
scouting activities nor bothered to entrench the army or distribute the forces in battleready formations so close to a potential battle field.
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Maps used by both sides were so highly inaccurate that it is hard to understand
how military movements could have been based on them. Due to poor knowledge and
mapping of the area, the Union lost an entire division of soldiers until later on the 6th.
The road to Grant’s Headquarters in Savannah from Pittsburg Landing was unknown to
the rest of the Union army, but it is also the road upon which the division was lost
(Luvaas, 1996). The Southern army slept within earshot of the Union encampments.
Beauregard awoke the night of the 5th to banging drums. He quickly sent a staff officer
to quiet the noise but the officer returned and reported that it came from Union camps.
Despite strict orders to remain quiet, soldiers banged drums, shouted, issued bugle calls,
kindled fires, and even discharged firearms before getting a few hours of sleep.
Amazingly, the Confederate army remained undetected by the Union (McDonough,
1977). At dawn the men quickly ate breakfast and prepared their weapons. Johnston and
his officer council were still meeting when the firing of guns caught their attention. The
battle had begun (Figure 6). While the shooting continued Johnston mounted his stead,
Fire Eater, and rallied the men proclaiming, “Tonight we will water our horses in the
Tennessee River” (McDonough, 1977)!
Many of the soldiers though knew little if anything about Napoleon’s campaigns,
tactics, and strategy, however, it was Beauregard’s intention to use the set of tactics
Napoleon used at Waterloo, Napoleon’s greatest defeat (McDonough, 1977).
Interestingly, Napoleon lost at Waterloo in similar meteorological conditions due to the
timely arrival and intervention of Blucher and the Prussian forces on the British flank. In
much the same way, Beauregard, would lose at Shiloh as a function of the timely arrival
of Buell’s forces on the Union front line.
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The Battle Begins

Figure 14

Start of battle April 6th (McDonough,1977).

Had it not been for Colonel Everett Peabody commander of Prentiss’s first
brigade, the Battle of Shiloh might have been the Massacre of Shiloh. Peabody grew
nervous with all the reports of Rebel activity and the fact that nothing being done about
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the reports by either General Sherman or General Prentiss. Peabody sent out skirmishers
around five in the morning, April 6th, to investigate reports of rebel forces in the area.
Once his men ran into Hardee’s corps, he sent five more companies (Figure 14). When
the Union troops first got to Shiloh, Sherman’s men were the first to step foot on the
ground but were the least seasoned troops in the Union army. The experienced troops
who had fought at Fort Donelson were the last to arrive and camped next to the river, far
from the initial engagements. Most of Sherman’s men had only been enlisted for six
months and had yet to fire their weapons in battle, yet it was these men who were on the
front line when the Confederate attack began on Sunday morning (Cunningham, 2007).
The Confederate battle formation demonstrates the classic mistake of using
extended lines instead of deep formations for attack. As casualties began to mount,
corps, divisions, and brigades were soon mixed together in confusion as one filed in to
fill holes in the other. It became impossible to maintain clear command lines, and by way
of example, one regiment received three different orders from three different corps
commanders within a short time (Luvass, 1996). Around ten-thirty that morning
Prentiss’s and Sherman’s men were driven from their camp. Prentiss, however, held a
line with five hundred men on an old wagon trial called the Sunken Road. Generals
W.H.L. Wallace and Stephen A. Hurlbut supported Prentiss’s men making a grand total
of four thousand men that held the Union Center. The position would become known as
the “Hornet’s Nest” for its intense fighting (Figures 15 & 16).
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Figure 15

Prentiss’s Corps hold the Sunken Road (the Hornet’s Nest) (McDonough,
1977).
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Figure 16

Federal line at the Hornet’s Nest (looking in the direction of the
Confederate assault).

The Hornet’s Nest was the area of the battlefield that in which the most extreme
fighting occurred. As a function of Prentiss’s resistance in the Union center, General
Grant was able to fall back to the higher ground on the bluffs of the Tennessee River and
set a line of artillery for a final defense. Instead of feeding troops into the battle General
Johnston himself rode to the front line of the Hornet’s Nest to command the men and was
shot (Figure 17).
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Figure 17

Isolation of the Hornet’s Nest (McDonough, 1977).

Johnston fell from his horse and died before his medical aide could find the
wound. After Johnston’s death, overall command went to General Beauregard.
Beauregard and his staff agreed to keep Johnston’s death a secret so that the men would
not get discouraged during battle (Cunningham, 2007). Although, the original
Confederate plan was to attack the left flank of the Union army and turn it into the Owl
Creek Swamp and force surrender, when the Confederates attacked they did so along the
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entire Union front in such a way that command and control of the army was quickly
compromised. Even so, as the Hornet’s nest became isolated (Figure 17), an opportunity
opened on the Confederate right as Stuart on the Union left began to cave in.
Unfortunately, as command decisions devolved to a local and tactical level, the
opportunity was never exploited. The loss of the commanding general further exacerbated
the lack of direction being given to the troops in the field, so coordination of the battle,
and a strong attack on the right never materialized (Cunningham, 2007). The
Confederate command sent eleven or twelve waves of no more than three thousand and
seven hundred into the line of fire for six hours. Unable to concentrate a sufficiently
large force for a hammer blow to the Union left, the Confederate forces were frittered
away along the entire line of battle. The position of the Hornet’s Nest hid both forces
from the other. Each side fired aimlessly over the horizon hoping to hit the other.

Figure 18

One of General Ruggles’ cannon (aimed towards the unseen Federal line).
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Figure 19

Part of Ruggles’ battery line.

Finally General Ruggles convinced General Bragg that he needed artillery
support. Ruggles gathered sixty-two cannons and fired one hundred and eighty rounds
per minute into the Hornet’s Nest until around five-thirty when Prentiss and two thousand
and two hundred of the remaining men surrendered (Figure 20).
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Figure 20

Collapse of the Hornet’s Nest (McDonough, 1977). Note: L = The
Lexinton and T = The Tyler gunships.

General W.H.L. Wallace died fighting alongside Prentiss and his men. The line
for the Hornet’s Nest was about a mile long, but to the right flank of the Union
(Sherman’s corps) the opening missed by the Confederate command, allowed the Union
front to be re-established on the bluffs above the river (Figure 20), with its left flank
anchored to the river and supported by gunships (Daniel, 1997). According to Sun Tzu,
“Speed is the essence of war” (Giles, 2011). Additionally, Clausewitz (transl. Howard
and Paret, 1984) was an advocate of the fact that battles are not often decided by a single
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blow, but that outcomes are affected by chance and the ‘Fog of War’. Due to long
marches, lack of discipline, uncertain (and often contradictory) command and control,
lack of intelligence concerning enemy dispositions and the nature of the local terrain,
combined with the confusion of the troops once in battle, the Confederates lacked the
speed Sun Tzu mentioned for victory and the organization and fell afoul of Clausewitz’s
‘fog’ principle. Had the conditions of the terrain allowed Ruggles’s artillery to be
brought into the Hornet’s Nest earlier, the outcome of the battle could have been
different. Equally, had the Union used artillery in the Hornet’s Nest, the battle might
have ended on April 6th but Grant had most of his artillery on the bluffs above the river in
an effort to protect the landing site. Prentiss finally surrendered the Hornet’s Nest around
five o’clock that evening and the Confederates pressed toward the Tennessee and where
Grant’s last line of defense waited.
The Rebel army charged the high ground for about an hour against Grant’s
artillery barrage but could not gain ground. Grant had every piece of artillery his army
had lined up to defend the river (Figures 21, 22, & 23).
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Figure 21

Grant’s Last Line of Defense 6:00-9:00 p.m. (McDonough, 1977).

Figure 22

Grant’s Last Stand the evening of April 6th (Paludon, 2006).
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Figure 23

Part of Grant’s line to defend the landing.

In this part of the line under command of Colonel Schwartz, a Lieutenant Nispel
erected the only earthwork done by the Union side during the entire battle (Figure 24).
He built a mound about three feet high and about twenty feet long to help protect the two
cannon under his command.
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Figure 24

Lieutenant Nispel’s Earthwork on Grant’s last line of defense.

Once Beauregard saw that his men could not take the high ground from the
Union, he wisely called his men to fall back around six o’clock that evening. The
Confederates made their way back to the original Union camps around Shiloh and rested
there for the night (Cunningham, 2007). Some authors (Cunningham, 2007 and Daniel,
1997) believe this is the beginning of the famous “Lost Cause” theory. Many citizens
within the Confederacy wanted to know why Beauregard did not keep moving his men
forward to push Grant into the river. They did not know, nor understand the
circumstances and position that Grant gained by controlling the river bluffs and keeping
his back to the river, in a position where he could both defend, and receive, reinforcement
arriving from the river. It was at this juncture that the balance of the engagement turned
in favor of the Union forces. They possessed the high ground, controlled the landing at
the river, and (although they did not know at the time) had killed the Confederate’s lead
commander. The Southern army had been depleted by inefficient use of troops along the
entire line of battle during the day. Confederate food rations were low, they were
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absolutely exhausted from the journey and the battle, news of Johnston’s death got out,
and the commanders were bewildered at the situation. Some authors and historians
(Cunningham, 2007; Daniel, 1997; McDonough, 1977; Cottrell, 2001) have written that
the South won the first day of battle but the truth was that morally, physically, and
mentally they were defeated at this point. During the night the Union received Buell’s
much-needed reinforcements. The Confederate cavalry commander Lieutenant Colonel
Nathan Bedford Forrest seems to be the only commander who understood the
implications of what reinforcements meant for the Union position and morale. Forrest
sent scouts to the Union camp that night and they discovered eighteen thousand men
unloading at the landing. General Buell had finally arrived. When Forrest tried to warn
Beauregard, he was ignored and plans for the morning assault continued.
Throughout the night the Union gunships, U.S.S. Lexington and U.S.S. Tyler,
fired every fifteen minutes in the general direction of the Confederate camp to keep them
awake but many of the soldiers slept anyway. Even if General Beauregard had come up
with some plan for the next day, more than a third of his army would be sleep-deprived
because they were up all night pillaging the abandoned federal camps. The next day
Grant realized he left troops in Savannah and sent for them to make their way to the
landing (Cunningham, 2007).
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The Second Day

Figure 25

The Union Army takes the offensive April 7th (McDonough, 1977).

On Monday morning, the Confederates woke to face a strengthened and refreshed
Union army (Figure 25). Grant had been reinforced late on Sunday evening by Lew
Wallace’s division of seven thousand men on his right flank along with Buell’s eighteen
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men. The Union quickly hit the Confederates at their former camps and drove them off
by mid-afternoon. General Sherman and his men gave chase but were cut off by Forrest’
cavalry guarding the retreat (McDonough, 1977). Shiloh finished much like it had
started, with a quick and staggering attack along the entire line of battle. At the end of
the battle some twenty-three thousand men had lost their lives. The death toll was the
largest loss of life the country had ever seen in any previous engagement on American
soil. Sherman wrote after Shiloh, “The scenes of this battle would cure any man of war”
(Paludon, 2006). At the same time the Battle of Shiloh was coming to an end Flag
Officer Foote of the U.S.S Essex lead a successful siege on Island NO. 10 in the
Mississippi River. The entire Mississippi Valley was now open for deep Federal
invasion. The South was also severely weakened and never would regain its full strength
(Cunningham, 2007).
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CHAPTER III
METHODS
Background (histories and accounts)
The historical background was primarily used for geographical and
meteorological applications. Personal histories, diaries, letters and accounts were also
researched for strategic and tactical facts to analyze influences of topography, geology,
and meteorology upon choices made on the battlefield.
Terrain analysis (geology and soil)
Geologic and soil surveys were obtained from the State Geologic Office of
Jackson, Tennessee in order to understand how poorly drained the area proved to be.
Table 1, below, shows the classes of each soil in the area and how they drain. The
Battlefield of Shiloh was traversed after a good rain for ground-truthing field work.
Table 1

Soils Classes of Hardin County, TN

Poorly Drained
Enville
Falaya
Hatchie
Mantachie
Melvin
Robertsville
Taft
Bibb
Waverly

Moderately Drained
Paden
Iuka
Dulac
Egam
Freeland
Lindside
Wolftever
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Well Drained
Almo
Beason
Dexter
Egam
Etowah
Pruitton
Smithdale
Pickwick
Sequachie
Luverne
Ochlockonee
Saffell

Prone to Flooding
Iuka
Egam
Enville
Falaya
Pruitton
Mantachie
Melvin
Robertsville
Bibb

Meteorological modeling
Data were obtained for 1862 by way of the PDSI and compared with years that
appear to have similar meteorological phenomena. The Palmer Drought Severity Index
(PDSI) for the years 1957 and 1980 were used as proxies. The PDSI was developed by
Wayne Palmer is the 1960’s. The index is comprised of data collected from tree rings to
determine the dryness of growth seasons, which in turn can be used to deduce estimated
rainfall values for dates prior to that of recorded meteorological data. The data for 1957
and 1980 (both El Nino years) were obtained from the NOAA website and the values for
PDSI and rainfall were averaged in an Analog Forecast for 1862. The charts below were
generated in order to place values on normal rainfall amounts for the study area
throughout recorded meteorological history. Rainfall values for the cities of Tupelo, MS,
Memphis and Nashville, TN were averaged together in an attempt to triangulate values
for Hardin County, TN from the months of January to May. Actual values for Hardin
County from 1971 - 2001 were averaged for further comparison in order to establish
understanding of normal rainfall measurements for comparison with estimated rainfall
amounts.
Table 2

Recorded Monthly Minimum Rainfall (per inch)

Closest Cities
Tupelo, MS
Memphis, TN
Nashville, TN
Average for Study Area

January
0.3
0.57
0.19
0.35

42

February
2.33
1.12
0.64
1.36

March
2.13
1.5
1.18
1.60

April
0.46
2.05
0.52
1.01

May
2.92
0.83
0.69
1.48

Table 3

Recorded Monthly Normal Rainfall (per inch)

Closest Cities
Tupelo, MS
Memphis, TN
Nashville, TN
Average for Study Area

Table 4

Recorded Monthly Maximum Rainfall (per inch)

Closest Cities
Tupelo, MS
Memphis, TN
Nashville, TN
Average for Study Area

Table 5

January February
March April May
5.65
4.63
6.94 5.66 5.22
4.61
4.33
5.44 5.77 5.06
4.49
4.03
5.58 4.47 4.56
4.92
4.33
5.99 5.30 4.95

January
6.98
12.21
13.92
11.04

February
9.88
10.51
10.31
10.23

March
6.35
12.08
12.35
10.26

April
5.88
12.29
8.41
8.86

May
8.44
11.58
11.04
10.35

Climate Data for Hardin County

1971 - 2001
Mean Precipatation (per inch)
Days with > or = 0.1"

January
4.99
7

February
4.54
7

March
6.13
8

April
5.33
7

May
6.56
8

Map renderings (geography)
Trips to Shiloh National Military Park were taken to verify troop positions given
in the literature. It is recognized that some features of the current landscape have
changed over the years, such as new trees and some elevation change due park upkeep
and accessibility, were taken into account while visiting the battlefield.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The field of operations for the Battle of Shiloh was a roughly triangular area
consisting of three to four thousand acres of plateau, about 80 feet above the river
(Luvass, 1996). There were many deep ravines, and to the south, running east and west,
was a heavily wooded ridge which rose one hundred and fifty feet above the plateau. The
area was mostly covered with hardwood forest, and very thick underbrush in some areas.
Two creeks enclose the field of battle, one to the north (Owl Creek) and the other to the
south (Lick Creek) the landing. At the time of the battle they could only be crossed at
certain points where there were bridges that had been maintained. In one respect the
position was excellent for the Union army, as it had its flanks resting on impassible
obstacles. The creeks flowed through wide, low, marshy bottoms (Luvass, 1996). Soil
reports for the terrain analysis reveal the classification and abundance of each type of the
soil within the area of the battle field (USDA, 2010). Further surveys were also
generated from the USDA Web Soil Survey tool; for the percentages of sand, silt, and
clay in each soil, flooding frequency; and depth to the water table (Appendix A). The
surveys revealed thirty different soils, many of them loams, and three different geologic
formations within the study area; the Eutaw, the Owl Creek, and the Coon Creek
Formations (Appendix B).
Meteorological information was gathered from tree ring data and compiled into
the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) for climatologists to reference data prior to
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1895. The index shows the wet and dry seasons of any year in the past 2005 years. The
wettest part of 1862 was from January to April according to this index (Figures 29, 30, &
31). Using the correlating years of 1957 and 1980, and estimation was derived to give
numerical meaning to the rainfall of 1862. Furthermore, due to the relations between
these three years of data, it has now been established that 1862 was an El Nino year
(NOAA, 2011).

Figure 26

Monthly Estimated PDSI for Hardin County, TN, 1862

Figure 27

Monthly PDSI for Hardin County, TN, 1957
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Figure 28

Monthly PDSI for Hardin County, TN, 1980

Figure 29

Monthly Estimated Rainfall for Hardin County, TN, 1862

Figure 30

Monthly Rainfall for Hardin County, TN, 1957
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Figure 31

Monthly Rainfall for Hardin County, TN, 1980
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY
The purpose of this study was to reveal the geography and geology of the land,
the meteorological influences, and their effects upon the human aspect (position and
tactics). Values were generated for precipitation of 1862 by averaging the data from two
years (1957 & 1980) with similar climatological phenomena as shown in Figures 31 and
32. The data suggest that 1862 was a wet year, especially from January to April, which
would make marching an army with artillery across this area of Tennessee difficult for
both the Confederacy and the Union. Trafficability is the most important aspect of
warfare. Armies could outrun their supply lines and be held up for days or weeks.
Armies could also be slowed to the point that more desirable opportunities are missed,
which in turn give the opposing forces more time for preparation, rest, or for
reinforcements to arrive. Soil surveys show the area of the battlefield to be high in loam
and clay content, which would drain slowly and become waterlogged once rained upon
for extended periods of time (January to April). General Johnston originally planned for
the battle to start the 3rd of April, but due to breakdown in communications and
supporting forces being held up by trying to move heavy artillery on waterlogged roads
delayed the battle until the battle began accidently on the 6th. The Confederates had
further problems coming north to the battlefield because they were converging in the
lower elevations where the waterlogged soils were the worst. Neither side was ready for
the other, although the Union had been there days before and had plenty of time to
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prepare and did not. General Grant and General Sherman both believed that the
Confederates would stay at Corinth to mount a defense, neither man new that General
Johnston had gathered an army the size of Grant’s. As a function of their beliefs
concerning the whereabouts of the Confederate forces, the Union army set up camp as
each boat arrived without any strategic thought or erected earthworks for defenses.
While the Union had an easier riverboat ride to the battlefield, they lacked accurate
knowledge of the waterlogged roads in the area and many miscommunications such as
the lost division between Savannah and Pittsburg Landing. The South had gathered some
intelligence but lacked a firm plan, while the Northern commanders had no idea that a
confederate attack was about to begin. The two armies were camped less than two miles
from each other, yet neither side was aware of the proximity of the enemy. The Union
army was busy drilling the inexperienced troops, which included firing their weapons,
while many of the Confederates were also firing their weapons to check if the gun
powder was dry enough to ignite. It is possible thunder and/or high winds with the
torrential rains acted as sound buffers which kept the two armies from being alerted by
each other’s drills, or they may have been firing at the same time and failed to realize the
other’s presence. Both armies might have heard one another sooner and prepared plans
of attack or defense had there been no inclement weather to muffle the sounds made by
bivouacked troops and practice rifle fire. Once the battle had begun the Confederate
forces were focused on the center of the Union lines rather than the Union left flank
where they needed to be in order to turn them into Owl Creek Swamp. Because of the
fierce fighting in the center, General Johnston rode to the front lines to push the men
through and was shot in The Hornet’s Nest. He later fell from his horse and died before
his personal physician could find the wound to treat. Once Beauregard took control of
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the army, it was too late to re-establish clear command lines for the plan to work. The
Union flanks had fallen back to defend the landing, which was on the higher ground,
while the General Prentiss kept the Confederates busy in The Hornet’s Nest. Weather
and terrain have more impact on battle than any other physical factor, including weapons,
equipment, or supplies (Winters, 2001). Clearly, Shiloh was no different. Waterlogged
roads slowed the Confederate march, which in turn gave General Buell more time to
arrive and a high Tennessee River made Pittsburg Landing the only suitable site for the
Union to come ashore. The mix of the meteorological factors and the terrain of the area
make harsh days for the Confederates, April 1st - 8th, whereas the Union were camped and
rested. Thanks to the weather, the Confederates were able to maintain the element of
surprise, but were too unorganized and weary to hold out both days of battle.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Throughout time it appears the elements of geography have always influenced
factors in the conduct and outcome of battles. The Battle of Shiloh appears to be no
different. Weather has always been a major factor in war (Winters, 2001). Veterans of
Shiloh reported many heavy thunderstorms occurring in the area between late March and
early April. New estimated climate data support the accounts of the combatants. Water
and terrain are also important factors in warfare (Winters, 2001). It was extremely wet
for the first part of 1862 and loamy soils, which are particularly prone to saturation made
the battle difficult, especially for the Confederate forces coming northward into the
battlefield’s lowlands. Unfortunately for The South, they went to battle without any
organized plan of attack for a prolonged engagement; therefore it was the element of
surprise that gave the South the upper hand at the close of the first day of battle, rather
than the effective use of terrain or the use of force at a critical point. The North remained
anchored to their supply on the river, received re-enforcements that night and controlled
the higher ground; therefore, second day went unquestionably to the North. Shiloh
became the battlefield chosen by the Confederates but proved to be dictated by the
inclement weather and possibly isolated by the weather as well. The South marched to
Shiloh to take a stand against Grant and his army. The North used Pittsburg Landing as
the location to being a land-based maneuver southwards to Corinth. It is evident that the
weather acted as a factor in the timing of the battle, and made an undeniable impact upon
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who claimed victory. However, the efficient use of terrain, conditions, intelligence and
resources control the outcome of a battle (Giles, 2011, Howard, 1984, Winters, 2001),
and the Union were much more efficient than the Southern Army. The Southern
commanders never decided on an official plan of attack, many missed opportunities to
remove the enemy from Confederate territory, and as a direct outcome of a lack of
political insight into military affairs, the Confederate army went into battle outnumbered. The scales of numerical superiority on the battlefield were tilted again when
the Confederates attacked along a three-mile front rather than concentrating their forces
at the critical anchor point on the Union left. As a function of the attack along the entire
Union line, Confederate losses were unnecessarily high for little result. Finally, numerical
superiority became overwhelming when Grant received General Buell’s reinforcements,
whereas the Confederate had no active reserve to replenish their lines. The only elements
the South had in their favor were that of surprise and some unexploited knowledge of the
area. There are many variables to consider for “What if’ analysis, but here are a few to
point out. Had the Confederates stuck to the original plan of moving a Union army away
from the river landings, they would have been able to control terrain more effectively.
Additionally, had the South not of focused on the Hornet’s Nest for so long they might
still have been able to push Grant away from the river (since the Union army was falling
back) before his artillery was fully placed on the ridge above the river. Also, had the
Southern army been able to complete the march in one day, they would have had four
days to possibly defeat Grant’s forces before Buell’s reinforcements arrived.
Unfortunately for the South, once the battle started they were highly unorganized, spread
their forces along the entire Union line and focused the majority of their forces on the
center of the line instead of the more critical Union left flank. The battle did, however,
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begin as a skirmish without either side officially given the order to attack, which
underscores Clausewitz’s principle of ‘Fog of War’ and chance exerting a controlling
influence on the outcome of the battle. The Soldiers simply grabbed their weapons and
ran into the fight without commanders or the rest of their divisions, under the “Fog of
War,” causing the South to become disorganized. It is also possible the Union army
might have established a more tactically viable camp along the bluffs of Pittsburg
Landing and defended them strongly until reinforcements arrived. After The Hornet’s
Nest was taken, Beauregard continued his frontal assault, but was unable to take the
bluffs of the landing that evening.
Were it not for the combination of weather and terrain in this area, there might not
have been a Battle of Shiloh. Had the weather been dry the Union would have had more
options of landing sites to get off of the Tennessee River. Assuming that the Union still
chose to land at Pittsburg, General Johnston’s army then could have possibly made the
march in one day with dry roads and defeated Grant before Buell’s arrival. Opposite of
that, had the Johnston chosen to stay due to the inclement weather and defend Corinth,
then the Union would have had to make the march through the boggy terrain only to find
a 55,000 man Confederate Army waiting on them. Tired and possibly without some
cannons, the Union would have had a hard time taking Corinth.
Both armies made poor decisions but the Union was aided by the inclement
weather and the terrain they landed upon. Fortunately for the Grant’s forces, they held
out long enough to overwhelm the South when reinforcements arrived and claimed
victory over the Battlefield of Shiloh.
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APPENDIX A
SOIL TABLE FOR HARDIN COUNTY WITH THE MCNAIRY COUNTY OVERLAP
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Map Soil
Symbol Description

Soil
Class

% Clay

% Sand

% Silt

Acres in
AOI

Am

Almo Silt Loam

Almo

27.4

13.6

64.7

10

Ba

Beason Silt Loam

Beason

37.8

17.7

50.5

340.6

CaA

Captina Silt Loam

Paden

29.5

11.4

63.2

5.4

CaB2

Captina Silt Loam Eroded

Paden

30.2

6.9

61.1

13

CbB3

Captina Silt Loam Severely Eroded

Paden

30.8

7

62.5

1.4

Cf

Collins Fine Sandy Loam

Iuka

11.2

68.1

35.1

10.2

Cg

Collins Loam, Local Alluvium

Iuka

11.2

68.1

35.1

159.3

Ch

Collins Silt Loam

Iuka

11.2

68.1

35.1

148.6

DcB3

Dexter Clay Loam Severely Eroded

Dexter

31

26.4

42.5

0.2

DkC

Dulac Silt Loam Severely Eroded

Dulac

30.9

20.7

56.6

3.6

Ea

Egam Silty Clay Loam

Egam

37.1

17.9

44.5

364.2

EtC3

Etowah Gravelly Silty Clay Loam

Etowah

35.8

17.6

46.6

4.5

Fa

Falaya Loam, Local Alluvium

Enville

11.2

45

43

85.2

Fm

Falaya Silty Loam

Falaya

12

20.7

67.3

39.5

FrB2

Freeland Loam Eroded

Freeland

27.5

41

47.7

2.3

FrB3

Freeland Loam Severely Eroded

Freeland

29.2

32.2

47

2.9

Ga

Gravelly Alluvial

Gravelly
Alluvial Land

Land

0.5

4.8

Gc

Gullied Land, Clay Materials

Gullied Land

17

Gm

Gullied Land, Loamy Materials

Gullied Land

25.5

Gs

Gullied Land, Sandy Materials

Gullied Land

4.9

Ha

Hatchie Loam

Hatchie

25.5

41

51.5

8.3

Hn

Hunnington Fine Sandy Loam

Pruitton

20.8

27

32.8

99.7

Hu

Hunnington Silty Loam

Pruitton

20.8

27

32.8

119.8
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Ln

Lindside Silt Loam

Lindside

25.5

11.3

66.9

199.1

Ls

Lindside Silty Clay Loam

Lindside

31.8

6.7

61.8

32.7

MaC

Magnolia Fine Sandy Loam

Smithdale

21.5

69.7

17.6

5

MaD

Magnolia Fine Sandy Loam

Smithdale

21.5

69.7

17.6

2.7

Mc

Mantachie Fine Sandy Loam

Mantachie

19

69.6

34.4

12.6

Me

Melvin and Newark Silt Loams

Melvin

27.6

13.9

64.8

125.9

PaB

Paden Silt Loam

Paden

26.6

6.9

60.8

1,059.20

PaB2

Paden Silt Loam Eroded

Paden

26.6

6.9

60.8

566.7

PaB3

Paden Silt Loam Severely Eroded

Paden

27.3

6.9

60.1

240.3

PaC

Paden Silt Loam

Paden

26.6

6.9

60.8

226.9

PaC2

Paden Silt Loam Eroded

Paden

26.6

6.9

60.8

67.6

PaC3

Paden Silt Loam Severely Eroded

Paden

28

6.9

56.6

88.5

Pc

Paden-Gullied Land Complex

28

6.9

56.6

2.4

PkB

Pickwick Silt Loam

Pickwick

31.3

13.7

59.9

73.5

PkB2

Pickwick Silt Loam Eroded

Pickwick

31.3

13.7

59.9

82.6

PkC

Pickwick Silt Loam

Pickwick

31.3

13.7

59.9

270.5

PkC2

Pickwick Silt Loam Eroded

Pickwick

31.3

13.7

59.9

138.4

PkD

Pickwick Silt Loam

Pickwick

31.3

13.7

59.9

126.1

PkE

Pickwick Silt Loam

Pickwick

31.3

13.7

59.9

3.1

PwB3

Pickwick Silty Clay Loam Severely
Eroded

Pickwick

33.2

7

58.9

84.7

PwC3

Pickwick Silty Clay Loam Severely
Eroded

Pickwick

33.2

7

58.9

176.8

PwD3

Pickwick Silty Clay Loam Severely
Eroded

Pickwick

33.2

7

58.9

37.6

Px

Pickwick-Gullied Land Complex

33.2

7

58.9

10.3

Rb

Robertsville Silt Loam

28.4

11.6

64.1

53.3

Robertsville
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RfE

Ruston Fine Sandy Loam

Smithdale

20.1

69.7

17.3

34.5

RuD3

Ruston Sandy Clay Loam Severely
Eroded

Smithdale

22.1

56.5

16.2

1.1

ScA

Sequatchie Fine Sandy Loam

Sequatchie

24.3

68.1

27

10.3

ScB2

Sequatchie Fine Sandy Loam Eroded

Sequatchie

24.3

68.1

27

16.7

ShC3

Shubuta Clay Loam Eroded

Luverne

40.8

33.5

13

3.6

ShD3

Shubuta Clay Loam Eroded

Luverne

40.8

33.5

13

4.7

ShE3

Shubuta Clay Loam Severely Eroded

Luverne

40.8

33.5

13

3.3

SmC

Shubuta Fine Sandy Loam

Luverne

38.9

70.1

9.3

10.8

SmC2

Shubuta Fine Sandy Loam Eroded

Luverne

38.9

70.1

9.3

0.5

SmD

Shubuta Fine Sandy Loam

Luverne

38.9

70.1

9.3

0.2

SmE

Shubuta Fine Sandy Loam

Luverne

38.9

70.1

9.3

1.3

Ta

Taft Silt Loam

Taft

25.9

13.6

65.9

25

Vb

Vicksburg Loam

Ochlockonee

13.1

44.7

18.9

30.3

Vc

Vicksburg Loam, Local Alluvium

Ochlockonee

13.1

44.7

18.9

147.5

W

Water

Wa

Waverly Fine Sandy Loam

Bibb

Wb

Waverly Silt Loam

WcB3

483.9
10

68.5

22.9

105

Waverly

13.8

20.7

71.2

573.2

Waynesboro Clay Loam Severely
Eroded

Etowah

37.4

35.4

31.1

12.7

WcC3

Waynesboro Clay Loam Severely
Eroded

Etowah

37.4

35.4

31.1

15.8

WcD3

Waynesboro Clay Loam Severely
Eroded

Etowah

37.4

35.4

31.1

6.7

WfB

Waynesboro Fine Sandy Loam

Etowah

34.7

66.9

28.7

10.2

WfC

Waynesboro Fine Sandy Loam

Etowah

34.7

66.9

28.7

45.2

WfD

Waynesboro Fine Sandy Loam

Etowah

34.7

66.9

28.7

52.3

WfF

Waynesboro Fine Sandy Loam

Etowah

34.7

66.9

28.7

20.9
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WgD3

Waynesboro Gravelly Clay Loam
Severely Eroded

Etowah

37.2

35.4

31.2

41.1

WgE3

Waynesboro Gravelly Clay Loam
Severely Eroded

Etowah

37.2

35.4

31.2

11.6

WmC

Waynesboro Gravelly Sandy Loam

Saffell

20

67.9

26.2

24.4

WmD

Waynesboro Gravelly Sandy Loam

Saffell

20

67.9

26.2

193.4

WmE

Waynesboro Gravelly Sandy Loam

Saffell

20

67.9

26.2

135.7

WnD

Waynesboro Very Gravelly Sandy
Loam

Saffell

20.7

66.9

26.7

32

WnE

Waynesboro Very Gravelly Sandy
Loam

Saffell

20.7

66.9

26.7

162.9

Wnf

Waynesboro Very Gravelly Sandy
Loam

Saffell

20.7

66.9

26.7

630.1

WoA

Wolftever Silt Loam

Wolftever

37.2

2.8

53.5

290.6

WoB

Wolftever Silt Loam

Wolftever

37.2

2.8

53.5

10.7

WoB2

Wolftever Silt Loam Eroded

Wolftever

37.2

2.8

53.5

156.4

WvB3

Wolftever Silty Clay Loam Severely
Eroded

Wolftever

37.7

2.8

52.9

16.5

WvC3

Wolftever Silty Clay Loam Severely
Eroded

Wolftever

37.7

2.8

52.9

4.7

Subtotals for Soil Survey Area

8,482.70

Totals for Area of Interest

8,503.20
McNairy County Overlap

Bb

Bibb Fine Sandy Loam, Frequently
Flooded

Bibb

10

68.5

22.8

1.8

En

Enville Fine Sandy Loam,
Occasionally Flooded

Enville

13.7

67.5

19.4

0

Ha

Hatchie Silt Loam

Hatchie

24.2

13.6

53.3

0.4

PaB

Paden Silt Loam

Paden

28.2

6.9

60.6

9.3

PaB3

Paden Silt Loam Severely Eroded

Paden

29.3

6.9

58

5.8

60

SaC

Saffell Gravelly Sandy Loam

Saffell

20

67.9

17

0.6

SaE

Saffell Gravelly Sandy Loam

Saffell

20

67.9

17

2.3

W

Water

0.2

Subtotals for Soil Survey Area

20.5

Totals for Area of Interest

8,503.20
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APPENDIX B
GEOLOGIC FORMATIONS OF THE SHILOH AREA
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Cretaceous (green) - sand, clay, silt, and
gravel.
Quaternary (purple) - sand, clay, silt,
gravel, and loess.
Devonian-Silurian (yellow) - limestone,
chert, shale, and sandstone.
Mississippian (white) - limestone, chert,
shale, sandstone, siltstone, and dolomite.
(http://www.state.tn.us/environment/tdg/)
Specifically to the Battlefield of Shiloh:
1. Eutaw Formation - grayish-green, fine-grained, glauconitic, micaceous sand,
interbedded with gray laminated clays which commonly contain carbonized or
silicified wood. Thins northward. 0 to 180 ft. thick.
2. Owl Creek Formation - sandy clay, greenish gray, glauconitic, fossiliferous;
merges northward in unfossiliferous clays and sands. 0 to 40 ft. thick.
3. Coon Creek Formation - fossiliferous, micaceous sand, silty, and glauconitic;
locally fossiliferous sandy clay at base. Siderite concretions common in upper
part. About 140 ft. thick.
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APPENDIX C
TIME TABLE OF THE BATTLE OF SHILOH
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February 1, 1862
Union: Troops posted along the Ohio River from Bird's Point to Louisville, KY under the
command of Generals Hallack and Buell.
Confederacy: Troops posted from Columbus, OH by Forts Henry and Donelson, to
Bowling Green and Munfordsville, KY under the command of General Johnston.
February 6-16, 1862
Union: Grants captured Fort Henry on the 6th and Fort Donelson on the 16th, assisted by
the fleet under Commodore Foote.
Confederacy: General Polk evacuated Columbus, OH and General Johnston fell back
through Nashville, TN and finally to Corinth, MS through northern Alabama.
Union: All of Kentucky and most of Tennessee is now open to the Union. General
Hallack now wanted to take Florence, AL. He sent Sherman up river by boat.
March 16, 1862
Union: Sherman found the country flooded by the spring rains and stopped at Pittsburg
Landing, the only good landing above water. Hallack ordered Buell to Savannah from
Nashville.
March 19, 1862
Union: Two divisions were camped at Shiloh.
Confederacy: General Beauregard came as advisor and assistant to Johnston. General
Bragg's corps joined from Mobil, AL and General Van Dorn was ordered up from
Arkansas.
April 1, 1862
Union: Grant stay at HQ (Savannah, TN). He had one division at Crump's Landing and
four at Shiloh.
Confederacy: Divisions were scattered from Burnsville to Bethel, TN.
April 3, 1862
Confederacy: 1 A.M. the order is given to concentrate at Mickey's the next day, 14 miles
north of Corinth and 8 miles from Pittsburg Landing. The order stated the attack to take
place on the 5th.
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April 5, 1862
Confederacy: The 14 miles from Corinth to Mickey's was not covered. The last corps
(Bragg's) did not leave Corinth until 4:30 P.M.
Union: At noon Buell's leading division reached Savannah.
April 6, 1862
Union: Army scattered about in isolated camps unaware of the enemy two miles away
and with no defensive lines, outpost, no one to give orders in the absence of Grant (who
was 9 miles away).
Confederacy: Army approached unobserved by the Union and bivouacked in several
lines of battle on a front of about 2,000 yards about 2 miles from the Union camps.
Union: An old soldier by the name of Major Powell went down Corinth Road with 3
companies before daylight and ran into the Confederate outpost under the command of
Major Hardcastle at 5 A.M. The engagement lasted from 5-6:30 A.M., when Powell was
driven back.
Confederacy: Johnston gives the order to attack at daybreak.
Union: At 7:30 A.M. General Prentiss supported his scouting party and had his men
formed in line in advance of their camps. Sherman's brigades formed lines in front of
their camps as well. At 8 A.M. lines position in front of Sherman's camps. At 9:30 A.M.
Prentiss was attacked and driven back through his camps. Cleburne's division was
attacked and dispersed. At 10:30 A.M. Sherman was driven to the rear, along with
McClernand's 3rd brigade. Prentiss rallied about 500 men on the Sunken Road in the rear
of the Duncan Field. Prentiss was joined by a regiment from the landing and by one of
W. H. L. Wallace's brigades. Hulbert brought forth 2 brigades and formed on Prentiss's
left. It has now been 5 hours into the battle.
Confederacy: Johnston ordered wave after wave of attacks on the Hornet's Nest. By 11
A.M. all the reserves were engaged. The line was 4 miles long.
Union: By noon the flanks were in full retreat but the Confederates were making no
impression on the center. By 4 P.M. the right was bent far to the rear.
Confederacy: Johnston fell while taking personal command of the attack on the Hornet's
Nest center. He died before a wound could be found.
Union: By 5 P.M. Hulbert had been driven off and Prentiss was surrounded. W. H. L.
Wallace was killed and about 2,000 men were captured by the Confederates. At 6 P.M. a
desperate effort was being made to rally a sufficient force to oppose another Confederate
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advance. About 5,000 men were formed into a defensive line. It made a formidable line
and would have been a good defense to start with.
Confederacy: General Bragg seemed to be the leading force to the Confederacy; he
made strenuous efforts to organize a force for another attack. Many of the soldiers
gathered had been in the worst fighting already and still fell into line for yet another
attack. A feeble attack was made before Beauregard's orders were received for a retreat
for the night.
April 7, 1862
Union: At day break Grant, backed by Buell's 18,000 plus reinforcements, attack the
Confederates at the Shiloh meeting house and force them back to Corinth by noon.
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